The authors discuss the Common Industrial Protocol (CIP), an instrument used in many types of networks, including EtherNet and DeviceNet. The CIP is classified into a large number of variants, for example CIP Safety, CIP Sync, or CIP Energy, to facilitate easy communication between industrial network components that need to interact with other elements in the given network. Out of these categories, CIP Safety will be described in greater detail, with a particular focus on the principles and applications of this version of the protocol.
Introduction
The meaning and purpose of safety are well known, and all people active in industry should be aware of their functional interpretation. The term functional safety covers the overall safety of machines [5] , which can be achieved through various means, including fixed or movable guards, electronic, electromechanical or other machinecontrolling hardware or applications, and information-related measures that generally help us to decrease the level of risk in machines and processes. The safety-oriented category [1] of the Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) [2, 4] is widely used for instances and fields (such as machinery) where a high degree of Safety Integrity Level is needed.
CIP Safety
CIP Safety (Fig. 1) is an extended version of CIP messaging. As it is an extension, any device which cannot decode CIP safety is not involved in the communication. Identical principles are used for CIP Sync [8] in performing time synchronization, for example with respect to motion control on the axes and CIP Energy in devices measuring power consumption and power network quality.
CIP Safety [1, 3, 7] applies two basic principles of safety engineering practice: redundancy and diversity. CIP Safety uses only Class 1 connection. In any case of closed communication, all the outputs go to the safe state (logical 0). Every input/output card of the network has one connection, which means that the CPU ensures 99.9% diagnostics on every safety card regarding the events occurred and the measures to be adopted for higher SIL ratings. For non-safety IOs, the connection can be set as rack-optimized; thus, in an ideal case, sixty-three IO cards (each can have up to eight IOs) can be communicated over one connection. In safety connection, we can set the Safety Network Number; this is a unique code set up in the course of the programming phase, and it is combined with the node's IP address to get the UNID (Unique Node ID) used for clear identification of the point for communication. The Safety Network Number is generated automatically, but it can be modified by the designer or programmer of the safety system.
The second highly precise technique to be described utilizes time stamps in every data package of the connection. This method is referred to as the Connection Reaction Time Limit (CRTL), and it is available in two forms: the CRTL of the inputs and outputs, both observable from the CPU. The number of inputs multiplied by the RPI value plus the latency of the network will yield the value of the CRTL for the inputs; in the output signal, the aspects considered comprise the Safety Task period and the latency of the network.
The third technique to provide safety information between two members of a safety network is the CRC. 
Measures to render CIP Safety reliable
Although it is generally known how to transport safety data between two devices, we also have to be sure that the data have been transported to the right device. For this purpose, we use the property of every safety-related device, namely the UNID (Unique Network Identifier). The UNID can be identified as a MAC address, but it can also be modified by the SW designer if necessary. The UNID is encoded and safe-checked in all safety connections. As regards EtherNet [6] , the UNID stems from the combination of the SNN (Safety Network Number) and the IP address of a node in the network. Thanks to this feature, the safety architecture is not restricted to one IP address set in the device, and we can use, for example, DHCP or BootP servers to obtain the IP address. The UNID has to be set up manually during the development/maintenance phase by the system designer or supervisor, and setting up the UNID and the IP address is fully independent.
Safety functions originated and were progressively developed in the 1980s and 1990s; at the time, this was the only method to produce safe applications. The actual evolution proceeded from hard-wired emergency stop buttons through switches and safety relays to contactors. Safety functions became very difficult to interconnect when more operational modes were available on one machine (such as a press), and therefore safety elements consumed a substantial part of the operating space of a machine. With the EN954-1 standard, there was also no other procedure to handle safety functions than that constituted by electromechanical devices. However, as both technology and safety keep moving forward, special safety systems started to appear in the late 1990s, facilitating the connectability of all safety devices into a single system and enabling us to decide what safety functions could be materialized on a software basis in conjunction with relevant sensors. From the perspective of legislation, this was nevertheless possible only with difficulty because, according to relevant laws from the given period, at least one emergency stop device had to be an electromechanical apparatus. After new legal standards were adopted in 2002, safety PLCs became applicable without certification restrictions.
Safety PLCs (usually with a redundant processor, networks, and other internal parts) are very effective even when other machine safety projects have to be adapted to the device in a complicated manner. But certain requirements for more complex functions surfaced too, including operation under safe speed or safe position of the proportional valves. Such demands can be satisfied only via microprocessor solutions as these applications are hard to solve by simple relays.
When safety had become a major aspect for machine users and operators, it was to be soon followed by the distributed solution of safety. In Germany, the committee for safety fieldbuses was founded in 1989 with the aim to adapt safety requirements transported over networks in line with the basic bundle of safety standards -the IEC (later also EN) 61508. Among the outcomes of the work performed by this committee there is also the CIP Safety published by the ODVA on the basis of the CIP.
Measures to keep CIP Safety reliable
Before transporting safety information, we need to create a Safety Channel on the network. The Safety Channel consists of a Client and a Server; on each of these two members, some validator has to be present to confirm whether the information is safe and, more importantly, reliable. The Safety device can be a monitor, a controller, an input or output, and an input or output device (sensor or actuator). The controller and monitor communicate with the I/O devices through I/O modules. This set of devices is referred to as the Safety Chain. Whenever the validator checks the reliability of a message (Table 1) , it uses the sequence of the pinging source with CRC ending and evaluates the CRC time stamp, time stamp, CRC data, safety data, and CRC complement data. Furthermore, cross checking is also performed within this operation. When the connection is terminated, the application is informed of such termination to be able to execute interventions including the de-energetising of the outputs. The CRCs used for CIP safety purposes are CRC-S1 or S2; these versions contain two bytes, of which one (8bit) byte is for the CRC safety data, and the other is for the time stamp. The 16bit CRC-S3 is used for the CRC of the safety basic data with lengths from 3 to 250 bytes.
Comparison of the wired and network techniques
Let us now compare the outlined approaches for the purpose of very simple statistical data calculation. In this context, let us build a model case with a safety gate including a monitoring electromechanical switch that comprises two contacts connected in wiring category 3. The output will contain two contactors with feedback loop monitoring. Generally, two different solutions are to be performed; while we use a safety module or a relay for the safety logic function in the first method, the second case will involve a safety system using EtherNet/IP.
The safety relay approach
Safety relay is an incorrect term for a device which should be regularly referred to as a safety module. Some time ago, this safety module consisted of several relays packed in one box; these relays were interconnected to resolve problems related to safety, diagnostics, resetting, and some other safety and non-safety functions using the NO and NC contacts of classical electro-magnetic relays.
In order to evaluate the safety function, we have to define the concrete device for which the manufacturer provides statistical values of dangerous failures. Furthermore, it is necessary to determine the value following from the designer's assumption of how often the safety function will be used; to illustrate this statement, we could refer again to the case where the value expresses simultaneously the frequency of a safety gate opening and the exclusion of a potentially hazardous situation. At this point, let us choose the simplest solution: the designer will include in the manual two elementary parameters, namely the number of switching cycles per twenty years and the probability of a dangerous failure per the same unit of time.
However, to evaluate the SIL CL (Safety Integrity Level Claim Limit), we need also other properties, and these are as follows: Let us now suppose that our safety gate monitoring corresponds to the requirements stipulated by SIL2, which is included in the overview of significant risk assessment documents (Table 2) . We intend to build a system respecting the provisions of the SIL2, and there are three possibilities of how to satisfy the given specifications. The first option is that we will structure a system comprising a triple channel (HFT = 2); in these circumstances, the Safe Failure Fraction rate can equal 60% or less. The second and most common alternative involves a dual channel (HFT = 1), where the reliability indicator ranges between 60 and 90% of the SFF. Finally, the last choice consists in a single channel (HFT = 0); here, however, it is necessary to reach more than 90% of the SFF. Which of these ways, then, is the easiest one? In response, we could definitely point to the first approach, yet such a solution would not be economical. For machinery safety, only a very limited number of components are connectable via the triple channel in the sensors part, and there is no safety module for the triple channel device; thus, the only method to resolve the problem is to use some type of the safety PLC, which can be adjusted by software. But the modification via software is no simple step either, because the prepared and certified blocks for the evaluation of safety functions are "only" dual channel. The last option (a single channel and SFF rate of 90 -99%) cannot bring the desired benefit, as it simply requires too much diagnostics, thus necessitating the use of difficult systems to detect serious failures. The most advantageous and easy-to-connect procedure will be the middle option, namely a dual channel with a relatively low SFF indicator.
Another step is to determine the architecture of entire subsystems. Our safety function consists of three subsystems: an electro-mechanical safety switch; a safety module evaluating signals from the sensor; and a pair of safety contactors controlling the power supply to the motor performing dangerous movements of the machine. Because we have HFT = 1, we will use the dual channel configuration. This brings us to the architectures of subsystems C or D; the difference between these two types lies in the Common Cause Failure rate (CCF). As it is essential to have a Common Cause Failure in both the electro-mechanical switch and the safety contactors, we need to use type D architecture. The CCF is well described in annex F of the IEC 62061 standard. To obtain positive evaluation, we have to adopt some measures to lower the CCF indicator. For every single measure, we will receive points to be summarized, and Tab. F.2 of the IEC 62061 standard contains the "beta factor" which will be needed later for our calculations. Even though it is necessary to admit that more fulfilled measures produce more points and a better beta-factor, we also have to note that such conditions result in increased expenditure on the project. Our previous experience nevertheless shows that a score of between 70 and 80 points is reachable with rather small investment and that the beta factor of 2% is low enough to fundamentally influence the PFH D value at the final stage.
We have to calculate the failure rate for the electromechanical switch and also for the contactors according to formula D.1 from the IEC 62061 standard:
Further, we will calculate the failure rate of dangerous failures, namely (2) to finally obtain the PFH D . These calculations have to be performed for all elements of the inputs and outputs. If we use the safety electromechanical switch which exhibits B 10D 10 6 cycles and the testing interval of 50 ms, the SFF rate will be 85%; we will thus obtain PFH Dinputs = 1.5·10 -7 . We will use two contactors, each exhibiting B 10D 2·10 7 cycles and the testing interval of 50 ms; the SFF indicator will then equal 85%, too. In this manner, we have PFH Doutputs = 6.2·10 -9 . For the safety module, the procedure is simple: we will follow the manufacturer data sheet, which informs us that in SIL 3 we obtain the formula expressed below PFH Doutputs = 1.2·10 -8 . Now, we can define the PFH DSafetyRelay for the complete safety function. According to article 6.6.3.2.3 of the IEC 62061 standard, the complete PFH D will be calculated as the sum of all partial PFH Di values. For our situation, the equation will be as follows: (3) The complete result of the PFH DSafetyRelay is 1.682·10 -7 . With this outcome, we will proceed to Tab. 3 to find out that our result corresponds to SIL 2. NOTE: Where the required safety integrity of a SRCF is less than SIL 1, the requirements of category B of ISO 13849-1 should be met as a minimum.
Solution using safety PLC
The major part of the evaluation will be identical with that outlined in the previous chapter. The inputs and contactors include all properties exhibited by the CCF, PFH D , SFF and other parameters; the novel part to be introduced in this section is the logical element. This time, five subsystems are included: the inputs representing the electromechanical switch; the distributed safety inputs connected over EtherNet/IP; the safety CPU; the distributed safety outputs connected over EtherNet/IP, too; and safety contactors functioning as actuators.
The equation for the calculation will remain virtually unchanged; the only difference will consist in the overall PFH DSafetyPLC , as indicated below: (4) For the values of the inputs and outputs, we will use the data from the part describing the safety module, where the value PFH Dinputs = 1.5·10 -7 represents the safety electromechanical switch and 1.2·10 -8 relates to the redundant safety contactors. The distributed safety inputs (Allen Bradley -1734-IB8S) exhibit PFH DCPUinputs = 5.1·10
-10 , and the distributed safety outputs (Allen Bradley 1734-OB8S) are expressed as PFH DCPUoutputs = 5.14·10
-10 . The safety CPU (Allen Bradley 1756-L71S) then has PFH DCPU = 1.2·10 -9 . We can thus see that the overall PFH DSafetyPLC equals 1.63224·10 -7 . In view of the preceding facts, it is possible to claim that using the safety PLC is more reliable than applying the safety module. To substantiate this statement, we can introduce the following description:
The EtherNet/IP with the CIP Safety protocol is certified up to the SIL3, which represents the values of PFH D = 10 -8 and lower. Thanks to the CRC and the other measures specified above, the probability of residual errors in the network oscillates between the values 10 -19 and 10 -20 . In this context, the PFH D value will then be approximately 9·10 -13 , this being a number we can neglect in calculations even for the SIL3.
Comparison of simple architectures
In the chapters above, we made simple calculations of an architecture based on safety modules and a safety PLC with distributed inputs and outputs. When considering only the PFH D value, we can highlight the safety PLC as a slightly better solution.
Advantages of safety modules
In the safety domain, the time response exhibits a critical value. The typical response time of safety modules is approximately 10 ms. Compared to this, the safety PLC displays a significantly higher value because a simple safety program exhibits a scan time of about 25 ms; however, we also have to account for the reaction time of the inputs, (which equals 16.2 ms in our case) and the reaction time of the outputs (6.2 ms). The last value relates to the Ethernet network. We have thus described a simple solution with no Ethernet switch or devices such as drives or the HMI; even though the expectable latency of the network oscillates around 3 ms, this value is subject to further growth proportional to the traffic increase within the network. The reaction time of the proposed simple solution reaches approximately 50 ms, and this is still a very low number. Controlling fast actions, such as those performed by the clutch-brake valve on an eccentric press, requires a very long time; therefore, the period necessary for fast action control is up to 5 ms.
Advantages of safety PLCs.
Connecting more safety modules together is not a difficult task when the logical function AND is available between the particular modules and the safe state of the machine. With a more complex function for the safety modules (OR) and wherever more demanding logical linkage between such modules is needed, the number of output contacts begins to grow dramatically. As this number expands, the PFH D increases as well. However, the count of contacts may become so high that, for the same safety function with the same hardware but more contacts at the output side, degradation of the PFH D will occur (such as the demotion from the SIL2 to the SIL1). Furthermore, we have to consider that the response times can grow too. With the safety PLC, the situation is nevertheless very simple: all the safety inputs and outputs are wired, and the logical function will be defined in the control safety software. There will remain the same PFH D , and the time response increase will be neglectable.
Conclusion
This paper describes the Common Industrial Protocol, a technique used in many types of networks, including EtherNet/IP or DeviceNet. The Common Industrial Protocol Safety is presented in detail with a particular focus on its principles and applications, and a simple example of the safety problem is analyzed. The proposed solutions comprise the classical wired approach and the method employing CIP Safety integrated in Ethernet/IP. The result obtained from the comparison of both solutions is as follows: The differences in the base safety function between the solutions remain very small (if we compare PFH DSafetyRelay = 1.682·10 -7 and PFH DSafetyPLC = 1.63224·10 -7 , we obtain the difference of only 4.98·10 -9
), but the procedure using CIP Safety brings more additional features, for example the advantage of safety module diagnostics. The situation nevertheless changes if we need to apply complex functions (such as OR). The classical solution requires more safety input/output contacts, and the parameter PFH D increases more than with Safety PLCs.
